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Rose J. Spalding, “Civil Society Engagement in Trade Negotiations: CAFTA Opposition 




This article analyzes civil society participation in the free trade debate by focusing on 
networks that opposed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in El 
Salvador.  Drawing on documents, observations, and semi-structured interviews with 
civil society leaders, two kinds of opposition coalitions are identified.  “Critic 
negotiators,” emphasizing active engagement and policy research, used the limited 
participation space opened by authorities to push for reform.  “Transgressive resisters,” 
repudiating the formal consultation process, deployed confrontational tactics and posed 
more fundamental challenges.  This work uses social movement theory to explore 
coalition resource mobilization, the role of movement entrepreneurs, strategic decision-






     Over the past decade, activist movements pushed at the gates of economic summits, 
shadowing trade negotiations, calling for new lending practices, and demanding change.  
Movement leaders maintained that forceful participation by civil society would make 
international negotiation processes more consistent with democratic principles and 
produce better policy results for the society as a whole.  As the idea took hold that civil 
society should engage economic negotiations directly, major international institutions 
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formalized consultation processes (Clark, Fox and Treakle 2003; Tussie and Tuozzo 
2001).  
     Yet the story of civil society engagement with international economic processes has 
been a difficult one.  Officials in charge often resisted meaningful incorporation of these 
groups, perceiving them as outsiders and questioning their representativeness.  At the 
same time, activist critics of corporate-led globalization frequently divided in their 
responses to these openings.  For some organization leaders, the invitation to participate 
in policy discussions with government officials and powerful international institutions 
represented a valuable achievement and a critical opportunity. For others, such 
participation led only to cooptation and threatened movement integrity. 
     To shed light on the ways in which civil society organizations engage transnational 
economic negotiations and competing approaches emerge, this study examines the 
relationship between networks opposed to free trade agreements.  Focusing on the free 
trade debate in El Salvador, I draw on documents, participant observation, and semi-
structured interviews with civil society leaders involved with the Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) process.1  Two distinctive opposition groups are identified, 
characterized here as the “critic negotiators” and the “transgressive resisters.”   “Critic 
negotiators” emphasized active engagement and used the limited participation space 
opened up by authorities.  While pushing at those margins, these critics accommodated 
the restrictions imposed by the prevailing system.  “Transgressive resisters,” on the other 
hand, rejected those parameters.  Mobilizing for action, repudiating the formal 
consultation process, and denouncing accommodation as defection, this alliance posed 
more fundamental challenges to the system.  Although the boundary between these two 
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networks was not absolute, they represented distinctive variants in the push to redefine 
the free trade debate. “Negotiators” are found to be more prominent in the earlier phases 
as processes opened and they labored to carve out consultative space.  Their political 
fortunes declined as consultation closed, however, and attention shifted to the more 
combative “resisters.”          
     Differences in the amount of change pursued by “reformative” and “transformative” 
social movements (McAdam and Snow 1997, xix-xx) or in the strategies deployed by 
“rule-conforming” and “rule-violating” collective actors (Piven and Cloward 1995) frame 
basic and recurring variations in contentious politics.  These categories in part reflect 
differences in ideological positions, but variation also emerges in movement “design 
code.”  Bennett’s (2005) typologies differentiate between older forms of NGO-centered 
activism, which were centrally controlled, and new forms of direct activism focused on 
global social justice using polycentric structures and permanent, de-centered campaigns.   
      Organizational and ideological dynamics identified in the Salvadoran case are 
consistent with patterns found elsewhere in the region, including the Summit of the 
Americas and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) processes, where transnational 
civil society networks divided between “insiders” and “outsiders” (Smith and 
Korzeniewicz 2001; 2007).  Tracing the shifting fortunes of these networks for more than 
a decade, Smith and Korzeniewicz track the gradual disenchantment and displacement of 
“insiders” and strengthening of “outsiders” as the FTAA process derailed.2   Distinctions 
emerged in their institutional structures, strategies, and collective action repertoires; the 
fortunes of these increasingly polarized networks were found to rise and fall with 
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changing combinations of domestic and international political opportunity structures 
(Smith and Korzeniewicz 2007, 252-55).  
     This study contributes to a growing literature on civil society and social movements, 
exploring perceptions of political opportunity configurations and the impact of intra-
movement rivalries on organizational dynamics.  New research on the transnational 
politics of civil society maps the rise and fall of competing coalitions, the processes of 
shifting between national and international negotiations, and the venues in which 
different kinds of organizations maximize their influence.  As international agreements 
and institutions shifted power from the national to the international and regional levels, 
civil society networks developed transnational action repertoires and a growing body of 
exploratory research on international protest politics has emerged (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 2005; Bennett 2005).  
     As a relatively new field of inquiry, research on social movement and civil society 
engagement in regional or international processes tends to be strongly conceptual.  
Theoretical insights emerge from the exploration of underlying patterns, the identification 
of critical junctures, and the mapping of rich typologies. Hypothesis testing and rigorous 
causal analysis, which are so critical in other types of social science research, have not 
been the centerpiece of social movement theory.  In keeping with norms in this field, my 
study emphasizes conceptual categories based on perceptions of political opportunity 
configurations and strategic decision-making, rather than causal theory or statistical 
testing of elaborate models.  Other scholars may build on this research, however, to 
construct testable hypotheses about the circumstances under which opposition coalitions 
converge/diverge, or succeed/fail. The growing number of cases in Latin America in 
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which social movements challenged the current wave of market reforms, and the marked 
variations in outcome (ranging from none to delay, partial change and full stop), invite 
rigorous comparative research on this question. 
Conceptual Discussion 
     Organized opposition to economic globalization can be differentiated along several 
dimensions—in the murky territory of social movement versus civil society,3 in the 
terrain of identity formation versus strategic negotiation, and in the differences between 
system transformers and system maximizers.  Several of these distinctions can be 
captured by the conceptual categories of “contained” versus “transgressive” politics. 
     The language of transgression, which presents itself commonly in literary analysis and 
gender studies, has recently been incorporated into social movement theory, albeit at 
times in an emaciated way.4  Inherent in the concept is the notion of violation.  
Transgressors place themselves in opposition to prevailing normative expectations about 
what is proper or correct behavior, and indeed, in the extreme, about what is morally or 
ethically “right” (Jenks 2003).  They call into question conventional categories and 
implicit assumptions; they insist on a reconceptualization of existing paradigms.  At root 
they challenge current norms, and, to the extent that norms are codified into law, their 
challenge may also be to the legal order. 
     My usage of the contained/transgressive distinction differentiates between collective 
action that is conducted within the rules of the prevailing system (albeit pushing at and 
expanding the margins) and that which challenges those rules and focuses on 
transforming them. Iniciativa Mesoamericano Comercio, Integración y Desarrollo (or 
Iniciativa CID) is seen here as an example of “contained” mobilization, in which 
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marginalized organizations combine to push for redistributive social policy using 
opportunity structures emerging from a late 20th century domestic and international 
democracy discourse. The Foro Mesoamericano leadership, in contrast, provides an 
example of “transgressive” mobilization, which attempts to redefine identities, repudiate 
conventional political processes (even as it benefits from changing political opportunity 
structures), embrace civil disobedience (usually nonviolent), and deploy dramatic, 
emotion-packed symbols of death and rebirth.  Transgressive civil society highlights the 
politics of passion to help overcome accommodationist tendencies and gives elevated 
status to extreme, transformative visions.   
     Intra-movement competition between critic negotiators and transgressive resisters can 
enhance inclusiveness by providing a wider range of organizational options, enrich policy 
discussion by resisting premature cognitive consensus, and promote accountability 
through mutual monitoring and specific challenges.  At the same time, organizational 
rivalries may fragment the movement, diffuse its energies, and reduce its ability to 
promote change (Wiktorowicz 2004). Although oppositional movements may fail to 
achieve their immediate objectives, sustained activism can have meaningful 
consequences over the medium and long term. 
Civil Society in Postwar El Salvador 
     Central American civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the growing 
organizational capacity of popular movements and the urgent need for more inclusive 
government in this historically authoritarian region (Brockett 2005; Wood 2001). In the 
peace processes that ended the civil wars of the 1980s, governments were pressured 
internally and externally to open political processes to greater participation by civil 
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society (Arnson 1999; Conaway and Martínez 2004).  In subsequent negotiations about 
debt and poverty reduction, and in emergency aid consultations following natural 
disasters (particularly 1998 Hurricane Mitch), international donor convocations and 
“Friends” committees routinely required the inclusion of civil society representatives in 
consultations with regional governments (Gass 2002).  During the 1990s, NGOs and 
popular organizations proliferated in the region, expanding into the opening political 
space (MacDonald 1997; Howell and Pearce 2001; Sinclair 1995). 
     The right-wing governments that tended to dominate in Central America were often 
skeptical of NGOs, viewing them as vehicles for demobilizing revolutionaries or 
assertive political rivals (Foley 1996; McIlwaine 1998). To the extent that they engaged 
civil society organizations, Central American presidents tended to privilege the business 
and private sector organizations where they had their roots.5  Non-business or “popular 
sector” NGO leaders, in turn, often found their governments to be remote--if not 
adversarial.6      
     In El Salvador, where political parties were highly polarized and the right-wing 
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) party won consistent victories, government-
NGO relations were often distant, particularly under Francisco Flores (1999-2004), 
ARENA’s third consecutive president.7  In the lead up to 2003 CAFTA negotiations, the 
Salvadoran government worked closely with its traditional partner, the business sector.  
Private sector leaders created an ad-hoc team, the Oficina de Apoyo al Sector Productivo 
para las Negociaciones Comerciales (ODASP), to consult with the government 
negotiators before and during the rounds (Orellana Merlos 2002, 22-24).  
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      Perhaps predictably, CAFTA enthusiasm was strongest within the internationalized 
segments of the business sector that had long lobbied to lift restrictions on trade and 
investment.  The American Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador (AMCHAM), an 
affiliate of the US Chamber of Commerce representing around 100 US businesses in El 
Salvador, was particularly notable for its support (AMCHAM 2004; Huezo 2004).  As a 
representative of US corporations that would gain easier access to both US and 
Salvadoran markets along with a host of trade-related measures (government 
procurement access, intellectual property guarantees, etc.), this organization lent 
considerable weight and resources to the effort.  Regional AMCHAMs worked closely 
with the Bush administration, which was stung by delays in negotiation of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) and eagerly embraced subregional FTAs as a mechanism 
to advance trade and investment ties. 
      The Salvadoran business federation ANEP shared this enthusiasm, citing the need to 
move beyond the temporary, unilateral opening provided by Caribbean Basin Initiative 
and Generalized System of Preferences to guarantee enduring access to the US market.  
At its February 2002 Executive Board meeting, ANEP gave “complete support to the 
initiation of the negotiations” (ANEP 2003). The association created the Consejo 
Empresarial Nacional para las Negociaciones Comerciales to facilitate business oversight 
of the process, its commitment tempered only modestly by the cross-sectoral nature of 
Salvador’s business alliance.8 
      Other voices were not so sanguine.  CAFTA critics in El Salvador emerged 
principally from two coalitions: the coalition organized by Inciativa CID and the alliances 
mobilized around the Foro Mesoamericano.  Personal interviews with 22 CID and Foro 
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leaders in El Salvador in 2004 and 2005, combined with direct observation and document 
analysis, shed light on the overlap as well as the distinctions emerging in these two 
networks.  (See Methodology Note at the end). 
Variants of Opposition 
1.  Critic negotiators 
    Iniciativa CID emerged as a new voice in these negotiations, combining active 
participation with policy proposals and promoting innovative cross-regional lobbying. 
Pointedly, leaders of the Iniciativa CID coalition did not object in principle to the idea of 
free trade, even with an economic behemoth like the United States (Rubio 2004).  In 
contrast with full-throated opponents who viewed the debate in more starkly ideological 
terms, CID affiliates approached the process tactically, even offering the prospect of 
conditional approval if the negotiations incorporated proposals addressing conditions in 
Central America. As CID representatives noted in a letter to leaders of the Salvadoran 
national assembly, “…a good commercial treaty with the United States could represent 
an opportunity for the development of our economy” (Iniciativa CID 2003b). The 
question was how to obtain a “good” agreement. 
     Given this mixed orientation and willingness to engage, CID activists in El Salvador 
played a series of roles in the CAFTA negotiation and ratification processes.  They built a 
network with various NGOs, pursuing breadth across the region and depth in local 
affiliates; conducted research to identify impacts on vulnerable sectors; developed 
proposals for amendments and additions to the agreement; pushed  for and participated 
actively in the “side room” process during the negotiation rounds; lobbied official and 
unofficial decision makers; and, in an effort to influence public opinion, disseminated 
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information at public forums, through their website, and in the local press.  After the 
negotiations were complete and the measure moved to the legislature for ratification, they 
pursued a legislative lobbying strategy attempting to slow the pace of passage and push 
for the inclusion of compensatory measures.    
     Leadership was provided from the outset by a Salvadoran research center, the 
Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE).  Founded as part of the organizational 
reconfiguration emerging from demobilization/reinsertion in the 1992 peace process, 
FUNDE had developed a reputation for professionalism.  Its organizers gained 
experience working cross-nationally as part of an international network of research 
centers participating in the Structural Adjustment Participation Review Initiative 
(SAPRIN) with sponsorship of the World Bank (SAPRIN 2000).  By the end of the 
1990s, as structural adjustment policies seemed to triumph, FUNDE refocused to take on 
an emerging issue—the contested arena of free trade (Rubio 2004).  
     Trade policy work was launched at FUNDE in 2000 when a team of researchers began 
analyzing the emerging FTA agreement between the “northern triangle” (Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador) and Mexico (Góchez, Lara and Tolentino 2003: 99-104).  
FUNDE researchers criticized the insularity of that negotiation process, and they called 
on the Salvadoran Ministry of Economy for the systematic release of information. The 
FUNDE team’s critical analysis raised tough questions about the impact and advisability 
of the Mexico agreement for those whose livelihoods were most precarious.  Their 
campaign targeted the national legislature, which only narrowly approved the measure in 
December 2000.9 
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     As preliminary discussion about a FTA with the US began to take shape, FUNDE 
leaders broadened and deepened their organizational effort. Building on cross-national 
connections developed in regional civil society gatherings, FUNDE played a central role 
in advocating a Central America-wide negotiating strategy. This alliance crystallized 
around the hub of FUNDE in El Salvador, Consejo de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo 
de Centroamérica (CIDECA) in Guatemala, and Centro Humboldt in Nicaragua.10   
     In addition to building a cross-regional network, FUNDE deepened its organizational 
base domestically. As an applied research center served by a well-trained technical staff, 
FUNDE was vulnerable to the standard criticism of NGOs—i.e., that their claims to 
represent civil society were suspect due to their small size, capital city base, foreign 
financing and elite credentials (Clark 2001).  Since FUNDE’s ability to represent civil 
society was obviously limited, the CID Initiative leaders worked to incorporate a broader 
series of like-minded organizations into their network.   
     Though muted now through time, civil war-era connections endured through shared 
Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional (FMLN) affiliations of some FUNDE staff and 
leaders of other social organizations.  Newer linkages layered onto these historical 
alliances through FUNDE’s many research and development projects, including the 
SAPRIN analysis. Under contract with a range of foundations, FUNDE staff members 
had worked with local organizations in capacity building and service delivery through the 
1990s.  This network of contacts with other NGOs and membership groups helped them 
identify allies eager to engage the issues raised by CAFTA.  In the end, CID mobilized 17 
local affiliates in El Salvador, mostly NGOs but with a sprinkling of membership-based 
organizations.  
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     Financial backing from a range of international development organizations allowed 
CID representatives to push for participation in the nine rounds of negotiation that 
officially constituted the 2003 CAFTA drafting process. 11  Pre-round consultations in 
2002 had focused on the business sector, and Salvadoran participation in CAFTA’s early 
rounds was heavily inflected by that alliance.  Business sector representatives attended 
the negotiation rounds, receiving daily briefings and holding further consultations in a 
side room (“cuarto adjunto”). 12  CID representatives inserted themselves into the process 
by attending the January 2003 opening round in Costa Rica and, throughout the early 
rounds, used their presence to push for wider openings to civil society (conventionally 
defined in El Salvador as separate from the business sector) (Henríquez 2003).  Given the 
developing pattern of civil society engagement with trade negotiations elsewhere in the 
region, the international legitimacy of a US-Central America trade agreement would be 
shaded by the credibility of a civil society incorporation mechanism.13 
     Pressured by emerging coalitions of activists, including some who had greater access 
to their governments than the Salvadorans, and by international actors, including the 
technical committee advising the process, Central American governments accommodated 
some formal participation demands. The government of El Salvador set up a Citizen 
Participation Program housed in the Ministry of Economy alongside the negotiator team.  
With funding provided by the Inter-American Development Bank, this office arranged 
presentations about the negotiations for a range of social actors, designed a website with 
information about the process, and kept tally of the contacts made with civil society 
(Citizen Participation Program 2004). The Ministry report on the participation process 
detailed a long list of 394 consultas and charlas with different organizations and sectors 
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(Ministerio de Economía 2004, 2-18). In spite of claims of inclusiveness, these sessions 
were largely directed to the private sector; 74% (292) involved business organizations 
while only 12% (46) involved other sectors of civil society.14   
     In addition to their eager participation in the modest spaces opened for formal 
consultation, CID leaders drew on their organizations’ research and policy expertise. 
Teams conducted studies on the most controversial aspects of the agreement, including 
labor rights, environmental implications, sensitive agriculture products, and the special 
concerns of small and medium sized businesses.  Troubled by the common complaint that 
critics were only nay-sayers incapable of offering alternative recommendations, CID 
leaders set to work on proposals. By the second round of the negotiations, they presented 
a series of recommendations on ways to remove sensitive products from the tariff 
reduction schedule, strengthen labor and environmental protections, increase democratic 
participation in the negotiation, and address related immigration issues (Iniciativa CID 
2003c).  By July 2003, CID’s Working Group on Agriculture offered its own agricultural 
and livestock proposal.15 
     Eight months into the CAFTA negotiations, as the text of the agreement began to take 
shape and CID representatives became increasingly persuaded that their concerns would 
not be addressed, CID formally called for a moratorium.   Careful to explain that this was 
not a call to terminate the negotiation process, CID proclamations urged negotiators to 
suspend the talks and rethink the procedures incorporated into the forced march 12-month 
calendar and a prefabricated negotiation process that used the US-Chilean FTA as a 
model.  A moratorium, CID documents claimed, would permit Central American 
countries to step back from the frenetic negotiations, complete research on socio-
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economic impacts of various concessions, allow Central American legislatures to define a 
baseline of institutional and economic conditions needed for a successful free trade 
transition (as had the US Congress during its 2002 Trade Promotion Authority debate), 
set up a more participatory process through a civic forum, and coordinate a regional (as 
opposed to national) negotiation strategy (Iniciativa CID 2003b, 2003d).   
     The moratorium call failed to slow the process, however, and a draft t reaty was signed 
on schedule in December 2003.  As the terms of the agreement were made public, CID 
staff members evaluated the final results (Tolentino 2004; Iniciativa CID 2004a.)  
Concluding that gains were targeted to very small sectors (a modest increase in the US 
quota for sugar producers, minor increases in flexible sourcing for the textile industry), 
the CID assessment for El Salvador identified lost opportunities and disadvantages, 
although it fell short of an overt denunciation. 
     CAFTA was formally signed by the Central American and US government 
representatives in May 2004. When I interviewed 14 CID representatives about their 
views on CAFTA two months afterwards, they overwhelmingly offered a critical 
evaluation.  The most common response, classified as “on balance, negative,” (79%) 
emphasized an array of problems associated with the draft agreement, although it did not 
entail rejection of free trade agreements in principle.  Unlike their more militant brethren, 
CID respondents identified possible gains (technology, transition assistance, leverage for 
immigration agreements, Central American unity) that could emerge from a free trade 
agreement under carefully negotiated conditions, but which unfortunately had failed to 
materialize.  A small number, categorized as “on balance, positive,” though far from 
enthusiastic, even viewed CAFTA as acceptable. 
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     When asked about their views on legislative ratification of the agreement, 29% of the 
Salvador’s CID leaders expressed outright opposition, a mark of their frustration with a 
failed negotiation. More commonly, however, CID supporters held on to a wisp of their 
earlier optimism (“It could be good, but not as it is”), calling for renegotiation rather than 
outright rejection.  Although claiming that Salvadoran negotiators had too readily 
capitulated to US demands without sufficient attention to local consequences, most (57%) 
CID affiliates thought a FTA might merit ratification if negotiation teams went back to 
the drawing board and more fully addressed issues of asymmetries, food security and 
adequate transition support.  This scenario was so unlikely that their position amounted to 
a rejection, but CID leaders were understandably reluctant to cut their losses. Two 
respondents (14%) were willing to accept the treaty with only the light “adjustments” 
proposed by US Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry—stronger sanctions for 
labor rights violations and measures to prevent environmental exploitation for trade 
advantage—rather than full scale renegotiation.  These reforms that were not the 
centerpiece of the CID critique, however, and most CID leaders continued the call for 
renegotiation. 
     After the CAFTA negotiation was complete, Oxfam America, an important funder of 
the CID Initiative, commissioned an evaluation of CID’s work.  Acknowledging that CID 
participants were unable to change the form or pace of the negotiations, this assessment 
praised their success in identifying new methods of influencing policy debates and 
breaking through the stagnant polarization characteristic of Salvadoran politics.  “Project 
results,” in which participation changes the results of the project, were distinguished from 
“process results,” in which participation teaches participants new skills, introduces new 
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angles and themes into an internal discussion, or builds functional and personal 
relationships with counterparts in the private sector and government (Díaz Barrera 2004, 
14). Although weak in the former, CID’s participation in the CAFTA negotiation was 
found to be a success in the latter.  With an emphasis on long-term goals of learning 
about international economic negotiation, identifying possible future alliance partners, 
enhancing policy development capabilities, and building visibility and credibility, the 
Oxfam evaluation praised CID’s work in spite of the minimal impact it had on the text of 
the agreement. 
     When interviewed in July-August 2004, CID leaders themselves generally expressed 
disappointment with the process. They divided, however, on the best way to understand 
the results of their work. Half (50%) described the outcome bitterly as an unadulterated 
failure that had been disillusioning.  As one respondent concluded, the process was 
“horrible, ugly, uncomfortable.  It wasn’t worth it” (CONAES 2004).  In a nuanced 
variation, however, 43%, while agreeing that civil society had no meaningful access or 
impact, still mentioned indirect or long-term gains from the process.  Much in the spirit 
of the Oxfam evaluation, this group emphasized the learning associated with 
participation—i.e., their greater ability to frame and defend proposals, their increased 
knowledge about how a trade negotiation process works, a better sense of where their 
concerns converged with those of other sectors, and practical experience in building and 
maintaining cross-national alliances with Central American counterparts.  One observer 
noted: “As processes mature, there will be benefits from CID participation. As training it 
will be worth it in time, but it has a cost now” (FUNDE 2004).  For this group, 
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participation was a failure, but not an unmitigated one. They did not view their 
engagement with regret. 
     Following their August 2003 call for a moratorium, CID leaders generally retreated 
from the process.  The leadership returned with a final push in the subsequent legislative 
ratification debate.  Fissures in the dominant coalition were targeted in hopes of securing 
tacit adjustments or complementary legislation to redress deficiencies.  Although the 
formally anti-CAFTA FMLN held a plurality of seats (31 out of 84) in the Legislative 
Assembly, the alliance between ARENA and the Partido de Conciliación Nacional 
(PCN), at times reinforced with Partido Demócrata Cristiana (PDC) support, allowed 
ARENA to consistently hold sway over major legislative outcomes.  With a fine-toothed 
analysis of sectoral interests and alliances, CID strategists lobbied PCN deputies to 
encourage a defection (Rubio 2004).16   
     When the Salvadoran ratification process came to a head, CID leaders issued one final 
statement: “…with the current contents negotiated in CAFTA, and under the current 
circumstances, CAFTA should not be ratified by our Legislative Assembly” (CID 
2004b).  In spite of the opposition’s efforts, CAFTA was approved by a 49-35 vote on 
December 17, 2004 (more on this process below). 
2.  Transgressive resisters 
     The main alternative to the CID Initiative was constructed by the local Foro 
Mesoamericano coalition.  A collective action mechanism rotating through the region, the 
Foro Mesoamericano was a recurring expression of resistance.  Viewing CAFTA as an 
unmitigated source of loss and destruction, Foro leaders in El Salvador used a series of 
tactics to express opposition to CAFTA, including highway and border crossing 
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blockades, authorized and unauthorized marches tinged with transgressive acts, and a 
physical takeover of legislative chambers. 
     Foro Mesoamericano began in May 2001 in Tapachula, Mexico, inspired in part by 
the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) encuentro process.17 Gathering 
together the regional threads of the economic globalization critique, Foro organizers 
pursued what Tarrow (2005, 120-24) has labeled an “upward scale shift,” explicitly 
moving beyond specific local issues to mobilize around shared challenges affecting a 
cross-national region. 
     Unlike the World Social Forum, which initially met only in its inaugural setting, the 
Foro Mesoamericano was envisioned from the outset as a rotating gathering.  A 
constantly changing locale allowed the network to strengthen local affiliates sequentially 
and to portion out the burden and rewards of organizing among a short list of those 
equipped for this undertaking (Bendaña 2003).18  The agendas of the meeting, designed 
largely by the local coordinators with varying degrees of input from regional partners, 
were both fixed and fluid; the central critique of neoliberal economic transition was an 
invariant, defining feature, but dimensions of analysis expanded in response to prevailing 
issues of the moment (privatization, the regional infrastructure development project Plan 
Puebla-Panamá, CAFTA) and the central concerns of an expanding pool of participants 
(indigenous, women, young people).  Over time the core forum became encased in a 
series of pre- and post-conference gatherings on additional and overlapping themes.19 
     As the Foro process became better consolidated and communications within the anti-
neoliberalism movement moved beyond insider networks, visibility increased and 
attendance grew.  Beginning with an estimated 250 participants in May 2001, reported 
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attendance climbed to around 800 in Xelajú, Guatemala in November 2001, 864 at the 
2002 Foro in Managua, and 1,495 at the 2003 Foro in Tegucigalpa.20   When the Foro 
gathering rotated to San Salvador in July 2004, registration rose to 1,747 (V Foro 
Opening Session 2004).  Attentive to the issues of gender equality, 2004 Foro organizers 
proudly announced that 43.5% of the participants were women, up from 34% in 2003 (V 
Foro Closing Session 2004; Comité Organizador del IV Foro 2004, 125).  
     The Foro “brokerage” function deepened as its leaders worked to link actors from 
different sites of contention (McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 26).  In a process defined 
as a “frame bridging” by Snow and Benford (1988), organizers worked to connect the 
national and sectoral components of their movement to a preexisting resistance 
framework.  The celebration of indigenous dress and dance in opening ceremonies and 
evening retreats, for example, provided not simply a pleasurable nod to the exotica of the 
neighborhood but implicitly attached the Foro movement to this cultural lodestone of 
anti-colonial resistance and shared history.  The potency of the frequently used image of 
maíz or the waving of machetes during culminating protest marches blended the 
movement with themes of peasant identity and rural resistance.  CAFTA became a 
“condensing symbol” (Tarrow 2005, 73) that melded a cluster of concerns around a 
single image. 
    The 2004 Foro Mesoamericano gathering was organized by two Salvadoran 
coalitions—the Movimiento Popular de Resistencia-12 de octubre (MPR12) and the Red 
Sinti Techán (RST).21  The MPR12 was the larger collectivity, involving a number of 
mass membership organizations.22  A “network of networks,” the MPR12 emerged from 
an earlier Foro Mesoamericano meeting in 2002, which concluded with a call to stage 
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simultaneous road-blockages throughout the region on October 12, a day that had become 
a symbol of anti-colonialism and resistance. Closing down nodal points emblematic of 
economic integration (including the Panamerican Highway and four border-crossings) on 
that date in 2002, the MPR12’s action was the first anti-CAFTA mobilization by 
Salvadoran “transgressive resisters.” (Rodríguez 2003; Mejía and Cruz 2002). 
     The MPR12 played a central role in mobilizing Foro attendance and participation in 
anti-CAFTA demonstrations.  The country where the Foro took place traditionally 
provided a substantial portion of the participants.  Since headcount normally affects 
movement credibility, the MPR12’s organizational reach provided an important element 
in the Foro Mesoamericano’s bid for recognition.    
        Red Sinti Techán was a loose network that pulled together a cluster of well-
organized, professional NGOs committed to the cause of fundamental structural change.  
Although the Red Sinti Techán could not claim a broad membership base, it provided 
thick links to the broader “altermundista” movement.23 These ties reinforced the 
principles and guidelines emerging within the hemispheric Alianza Social Continental, 
the region’s most significant resistance network.  Such connections can diminish local 
movement autonomy by imposing the discipline of a region-wide framework, but they 
also infuse local processes with continent-wide learning, helping to build more coherent 
transnational processes. 
     The central purpose of the Foro was to contribute to the “articulation of a 
Mesoamerican social movement for the struggle against neoliberal policies and to 
propose alternatives to the capitalist system” as well as “to strengthen the resistance 
processes for the Mesoamerican peoples of an anticapitalist, antipatriarchal and 
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multicultural character” (Information packet 2004).  Calling the Mesoamericano region 
an “Area of Humanitarian Disaster,” the final 2004 declaration promised collective 
opposition to CAFTA, the FTAA, PPP and other forms of “institutionalized violence 
expressed in feminicides, ethocides, genocides and violence against young people” 
(Declaración del V Foro Mesoamericano, 2004).   
     The MPR12’s evaluation of CAFTA, which was distributed at the meeting, criticized 
former President Francisco Flores for falsely claiming that the agreement would create 
100,000 jobs and absorb all the new entrants into the labor market (MPR12 2004a).  
Participants were reminded that Economy Minister Miguel Lacayo had made similar 
claims in 2001 about Salvador’s FTA with Mexico; the Salvadoran government had also 
proclaimed that dollarization of the economy would bring an abundance of foreign 
investment and new jobs.  Just as those promises had proved false, so the claims of 
general benefit from the FTA were also denounced as illusory.  MPR12 activists warned 
of an inundation of US goods, the ruin of local small and medium-sized producers, a 
collapse of basic grains production, deepening fiscal crisis, and further massive 
emigration.  Only sectors dominated by transnational corporations were expected to 
benefit. 
     Sectors of civil society that wanted to reform CAFTA, according to this perspective, 
were engaged in self-deception. As Red Sinti Techán leader Raúl Moreno (2003, 89) 
concluded:  
“Since CAFTA is determined by and has been constructed from and for the interests of 
transnational capital, it is not realistic to think that attaching labor or environmental 
clauses to the treaty could change its logic and its corporate slant.  The inclusion of 
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clauses only tries to imprint a “human face” on the treaty, when its content is 
incompatible with a focus on human rights.  Therefore, it is not possible to reform 
CAFTA.” 
     CAFTA opponents were called to reject free trade through acts of resistance.  Social 
mobilization was defended as an effective strategy, with recent victories celebrated in the 
water privatization “war” in Bolivia, the opposition to privatization of 
telecommunications and electricity in Costa Rica, the campaign against the privatization 
of health care and social security in El Salvador, and the halt to construction of an airport 
mega-project on peasant land in San Salvador Atenco, México (Moreno 2003, 90).  These 
successful confrontations demonstrated that neoliberalism could be stopped—but only 
with forceful and sustained mass mobilization. 
   Unlike their CID counterpart, the “transgressive resisters” emphatically rejected the 
narrow political space opened for civil society participation in CAFTA negotiations.  
Foro leaders refused to solicit access to the negotiation “side room” or attend any 
government-sponsored information sessions about the process.  Arguing that such actions 
would only be used to legitimize an illegitimate process, their strategy instead was one of 
public confrontation.  During the 3rd round of negotiations, held in San Salvador (March 
31-April 4), opponents mounted a “No FTA” march that reportedly culminated in a 
mortar firing on anti-riot troops and a demonstration on the outskirts of the conference 
hotel (Rivas 2003).  Marches continued episodically through 2003-2004 accompanying 
negotiation rounds in the region.  The July 2004 Salvadoran Foro gathering concluded 
with a protest march that stopped traffic along a principle artery in San Salvador, as 
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student activists painted the by-ways and US fast food restaurants with “No CAFTA” 
graffiti.   
     When interviewed in July-August 2004, Salvadoran Foro leaders were emphatic in 
their denunciation of CAFTA. (See table 1).  In contrast with CID leaders, who typically 
offered a negative appraisal that weighed gains against losses, Foro leaders saw the 
agreement more starkly.  Whereas 79% of CID leaders embraced an “on balance, 
negative” evaluation, only 37.5% of Foro leaders took that position, and none assessed 
the agreement positively, even in a qualified way.  Almost two-thirds (62.5%) described 
the agreement in entirely negative terms.  For this group, the accord was an expression of 
imperialism.  Describing it as “an instrument of annexation” (Red Sinti Techán 2004) and 
a “coup de grace” (CONFRAS 2004), they emphasized its destructive impact on local 
cultures and ways of life.  
Table 1:  Salvadoran Civil Society Opposition Leaders’ Views of CAFTA 
(Percent of responses) 





CID (N=14) 0 14% 79% 7% 
V Foro (N=8) 0 0 37.5 62.5 
 
     These assessments informed the respondents’ perspectives on legislative ratification. 
(See table 2).  Salvador’s Foro organizers overwhelmingly opposed the legislative 
endorsement that would put the agreement into effect; all but one (87.5%) called for the 
legislature to bluntly reject the measure.  Believing that CAFTA was an assault on 
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sovereignty that advanced the interests of transnational capital at the expense of the 
people, they demanded a full stop.  In contrast with CID leaders who generally called for 
renegotiation (57%), only 12.5% of Foro organizers viewed that option hopefully, and 
none would accept CAFTA with only minor adjustments in the labor and environmental 
provisions.  
Table 2: Salvadoran Civil Society Opposition Leaders’ Preferred Legislative Action 
on CAFTA 
(Percent of responses) 




CID (N=14) 0 14% 57% 29% 
V Foro (N=8) 0 0 12.5 87.5 
 
     When asked to reflect on the role of civil society in the CAFTA negotiations, Foro 
respondents took a uniformly negative position. (See table 3). In their view, civil society 
participation, whether by CID in its collaborative style or even their own protests and 
days of action, had secured nothing of substance in the accord.  In contrast with CID 
organizers, who split on the issue, with half mentioning indirect or long-term 
organizational gains in knowledge, technical skill, and alliance-building, 100% of Foro 
respondents viewed the effort as an unstaunched failure. The results of the negotiation, 
they argued, vindicated their rejection of the process.  CID leaders were at best guilty of 
“the sin of naivete” (Las Dignas 2004).  Over-eager to be seen as players, they “fell into 
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the trap” (CORDES 2004) and were now tarnished by their willingness to lend legitimacy 
to this process. 
Table 3: Salvadoran Civil Society Opposition Leaders’ Assessments of Civil Society 
Participation in CAFTA Negotiations 
(Percent of responses) 





CID (N=14) 7% 43% 0% 50% 
V Foro (N=8) 0 0 0 100 
 
    Foro leaders worked to disentangle their agenda from the reach of political parties, 
which were viewed with skepticism as even the FMLN negotiated away what movement 
activists regarded as core principles.   Instead of thinking in terms of electoral coalitions 
or lobbying for legislative votes, emphasis was placed on the mobilization of street-level 
opposition. Although calling for the legislature to reject the agreement, they designed no 
lobbying strategy to promote that result.  Perhaps better recognizing the futility of such a 
move than CID organizers, the resisters selected the tact of extra-legal confrontation and 
high-profile political theater.  
     Within a week of President Bush’s November 2004 re-election, Salvadoran President 
“Tony” Saca formally presented CAFTA to Salvador’s legislative assembly and urged 
speedy ratification.  The legislature’s CAFTA monitoring committee, headed by FMLN 
deputy Hugo Martínez, which had called for public hearings and an independent impact 
appraisal, was quickly dissolved by majority vote. Responsibility for the measure was 
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handed to the Foreign Relations Committee, presided over by Carmen Elena Calderón 
Sol de Escalón, long-term ARENA legislative leader and sister of former ARENA 
president Armando Calderón Sol.  As impediments to swift passage melted away, 
“transgressive resisters” acted.  Arriving in small groups early in the morning on 
December 16, 2004, MRP12 activists physically took over the legislative chambers.   
     These tactics accelerated the ratification process.  Clearing out protesters and 
establishing tight security measures, legislative leaders opened the day’s session in the 
late afternoon. Reportedly fearing an imminent anti-CAFTA mass mobilization (Calderón 
Sol de Escalón 2005), they introduced CAFTA to the agenda at 3:00AM and had it 
approved before closing the session eight hours later. In an overnight process that 
truncated public hearings, violated institutional procedures, and precluded meaningful 
legislative debate, El Salvador became the first country to ratify CAFTA (Spalding 
2006). 
Outcomes and Conclusions 
     Postwar formal democratization altered political opportunity structures in El Salvador, 
making it possible for civil society organizations and social movements to operate more 
freely.  Organizational opportunities expanded in the 1990s, supported by international 
allies and donors who valued civil society’s contributions to a democratic public culture 
and efficient service delivery.  New groups layered onto old, replacing, reinforcing, and 
reconfiguring the organizational landscape.  Many of these organizations focused on the 
social consequences of the ARENA government’s rapidly unfolding market reforms. 
     As the CAFTA negotiations took center stage, organizational differences widened in 
discursive, ideological, tactical, and even interpersonal terms;24 intra-movement 
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bifurcation stood exposed.  One coalition, building on a network of policy-oriented 
research centers and service-delivery NGOs with a reputation for professionalism and 
connections to international lenders, focused on expanding the participatory spaces 
within the evolving political system.  The other coalition, working with rights-oriented 
activists, student protesters, and social movements, some of which emerged during the 
war years, repudiated these constrained efforts and looked toward system transformation.  
     Critical of the system but believing in the possibility of reform, the CID coalition 
emphasized a “politics of expertise” (Smith and Korzeniewicz 2007, 252).  It prioritized 
knowledge acquisition and generation; active participation in officially designated 
spaces; policy recommendations framed with reference to the dominant discourse; 
confidence-building relationships with political adversaries; public dissemination of 
information through largely mainstream media outlets; and finely-tuned legislative 
lobbying strategies.  By focusing on strategies of opposition that emphasized a civil 
society discourse, system maximization, and long-term learning, CID leaders positioned 
themselves as “insiders” searching for the outer boundaries of reform.   
     Foro Mesoamericano leaders, in contrast, deployed social movement discourse 
seeking fundamental change through mass mobilization and the motif of transnational 
resistance to the capitalist system.  With an organizational “design code” that was less-
centralized and more fluid than that of its counterpart (Bennett 2005), the Foro promoted 
a participatory process to mobilize allies around an on-going social justice campaign. 
Convinced that the political and economic systems were fundamentally destructive of the 
interests of the majority, the Foro Mesoamericano leadership explicitly rejected 
participation in official processes, “realistic” policy proposals, and fraternizing with the 
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opposition. They emphasized confrontational politics designed to disrupt daily routines, 
often at the margins of the law, and emancipatory popular education techniques, 
including high-profile theatre that broke through their invisibility in the mainstream 
press. 
      CID leaders imagined the political opportunity configuration to be opening, both 
domestically and at the level of the international trade negotiation, and they used their 
resources to advance that process.  Foro leaders, in contrast, imagined those same 
processes to be closed, less emphatically perhaps than they had been in the past, but still 
unresponsive to public pressure.  These differences should remind scholars to attend to 
the role of perception as they analyze shifting political opportunity configurations. To 
some degree, these differences in perception reflect real constraints on the level of access 
that reformist coalitions may obtain relative to trangressive activists.  But they also reflect 
different calculations about how far a political opening might extend—a calculation that 
is difficult to make when change is underway and past experience may be an imperfect 
guide.   
     In the end, the traditional insularity of trade negotiation processes held sway, ejecting 
the “critic negotiators” and leaving resisters to drive the opposition.25  As ideological and 
tactical tensions riddled these movements, a campaign of mutual “decertification” 
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 121-22) and “discrediting” (Wiktorowicz 2004, 164-
68) emerged. Competition for financial resources, often from the same international 
funders, tightened the rivalry. Conscious “boundary framing,” where “strategies of 
polarization accentuate differences and draw sharp ingroup/outgroup distinctions” 
(Wiktorowicz 2004, 165), heightened coalitional differences. Their divergent goals, 
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prospect appraisals, and international alliances created fault lines between these two 
movements; in brittle terrain, these divisions hardened. 
      Social movements obviously respond to dynamic forces and shift across time 
(Edelman 1999; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). My intention is not to reify a 
typology or essentialize particular actors.  Many of those interviewed for this study 
experienced dramatically varied forms of engagement during different moments in 
Salvador’s turbulent history—within the country or in exile; in shifting political parties, 
mass organizations, or revolutionary movements; within or in opposition to the 
government.  Changing political opportunity configurations during post-war 
reconstruction and electoral adjustment weakened parts of civil society as they 
strengthened others, modifying trajectories and reframing debates.  Although the 
emphasis in this study on understanding recent forms of opposition draws us away from a 
longer-term historical narrative, the durability of the contemporary delineation should not 
be overstated.   
     Furthermore, attention to the adversarial dimensions of the relationship should not 
obfuscate complementaries.  In spite of their differences, each of these coalitions at times 
extracted gains from the activities of the other.  Although it is difficult to document 
“opportunity spirals” (Sikkink 2005, 154) associated with the actions of rivals, the 
transgressors’ forceful street protests in San Salvador during the third round of 
negotiations may have encouraged officials to open the consultative process more fully to 
the tamer representatives of civil society in order to tap down charges of exclusivity and 
enhance international legitimacy.  In the same vein, CID team research on the special 
vulnerabilities of peasant producers and small and medium-sized businesses helped to 
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“normalize” aspects of the resisters’ critique by providing evidence that their claims were 
not simply inflammatory discourse.    
          Hemmed in by a pro-market ARENA government now in its fourth consecutive 
term, an unsympathetic national media, a business elite bent on economic globalization, 
and a divided society in which neither the FMLN nor confrontational street politics 
enjoyed majority support, CAFTA opponents in El Salvador—whether “critic 
negotiators” or “transgressive resisters”—were unable to prevent ratification.26 Given the 
ARENA party’s long alignment with the United States, forceful commitment to market 
reform, economic dependence on trade and migration, and lock on national power, a 
CAFTA defeat would have been highly unlikely.  But the depth and persistence of the 
opposition’s critique may have played a role in the steady erosion of public enthusiasm 
for the measure. Even as more signatory states proceeded through ratification and the 
agreement advanced toward implementation, public opinion data in El Salvador reveals 
slowly gathering skepticism about CAFTA’s social impact.27 
      As the Salvadoran government mounted a full-scale pro-CAFTA campaign during the 
2003 negotiations, the public had tended to respond positively.  According to the Instituto 
Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP), 43% of respondents believed that free trade 
agreements would help combat poverty when polled in 2003.  (See table 4).  Repeating 
the question a year later, IUDOP found this sentiment had declined; only 37% were so 
optimistic. In contrast, belief that these agreements would generate more poverty had 
increased 10 percentage points, rising from 28% in 2003 to 38% in 2004.  By the end of 
2004, as the Salvadoran legislature moved to ratify CAFTA, positive and negative 
assessments of the poverty impact split evenly in the polls.   
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     Surveyed again at the end of 2005 and 2006, and asked specifically about CAFTA, 
respondents demonstrated still deepening skepticism.  In the 2006 poll, only 24.5% said 
CAFTA would help to combat poverty whereas 50% thought it would generate more.   
When asked to name the primary beneficiary of CAFTA, respondents overwhelmingly 
identified elites (33% “the rich” and 24% “big business”).  “Everyone” came in sixth 
with a modest 5% of the total (IUDOP 2006, 8). 
Table 4:  Salvadoran Public Opinion on Free Trade Agreements (% Agreeing) 
 2003 2004 2005* 2006* 
FTAs help combat poverty   43%  37% 29% 24.5% 
FTAs generate more poverty 28 38 43 50 
FTAs do not affect poverty 19 22 25 23 
Don’t know, no response 10 3 3 3 
*Surveys in 2005 and 2006 referred specifically to CAFTA. 
 Source: IUDOP (2003, 31; 2004, 28; 2005, 21; 2006, 8) 
 
     This reversal of support levels between 2003-2006 suggests that the medium term 
impact of oppositional forces may be more significant than the short term. Although 
unable to halt the policy process, enduring activist mobilization and on-going 
dissemination of information may play a role in the development of a more critical public 
perspective over time. 
     In many ways, both segments of the opposition embraced an essentially long-term 
strategy.  As CAFTA for them was only an element of a larger problematic, and its 
immediate defeat in El Salvador was best a long shot, both “critic negotiators” and 
 32 
“transgressive resisters” trained their eyes on the future.  CID leaders, working to build 
technical expertise in trade negotiation and skills in lobbying beyond natural allies, 
geared up for other economic policy debates, including the subsequent Central America-
European Union trade negotiations.  Although thinly connected to grassroots 
organizations in El Salvador and heavily focused on elite-level negotiations, this coalition 
developed a political dexterity that could be useful if the political system continues to 
open.  Resisters, on the other hand, frustrated by a peace process that failed to deliver and 
a consolidated economic model that concentrated wealth, had little hope for the “splinters 
of benefit” (Moreno 2003, 89) that political gamesmanship might offer. Captive to an 
ideological orientation and international alliances that removed them from the give and 
take of political negotiation, Foro leaders were entrenched in a strategy of resistance.  
Prospects for achieving their larger political objectives would have to await 
transformative political change. 
     The Salvadoran case locates a series of factors that support civil society mobilization 
but also weaken the opposition and reduce its ability to influence the outcome, at least in 
the short run.  Features that counter the movement include the presence of a consolidated, 
pro-market political elite, organized into a durable electoral coalition, schooled in 
defensive cohesion in the wake of a nationally defining revolutionary struggle. Close 
affinity with and economic dependence on the United States further encourage elites to 
deepen and formalize economic integration. The eagerness with which the Bush 
administration prioritized and pursued this reform, its insistence on using the US-Chilean 
FTA text as the model, and the accelerated pace of the negotiation, all reduced the 
prospects for inclusive negotiation, in spite of the formal consultative process.  These and 
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other factors tended to fragment civil society, ultimately displacing critics who were 
disposed to dialogue and negotiation, and fueling unsuccessful transgressive resistance.  
     This analysis suggests that under other circumstances—perhaps when the government 
is less cohesive, market convictions are less pervasive, susceptibility to pressure from 
external actors less pronounced, or United States officials less focused on achieving a 
particular result—civil society critics may organize more effectively to promote dialogue 
or challenge specific corporate-led market initiatives.  A larger theoretical study, building 
on longer-term analysis or detailed case material from a variety of Latin American 
countries, would allow us to explore these variations more systematically.    
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METHODOLOGY NOTE  
     To avoid over-emphasizing the views of a few official spokespeople, this interview 
pool included representatives of approximately four-fifths of the organizations affiliated 
with these networks and all organizations identified as “most important” by others in 
their cluster. With the exception of lead coalition spokespeople and public officials, 
respondents are identified by organizational affiliation only.  
     The interview questionnaire included both open and closed-ended questions. 
Interviewees were asked about organization history, network affiliations, and their 
specific views on CAFTA negotiations.  The “positive” or “negative” classification of 
their views on CAFTA was determined by their answers to closed-ended questions.  
Open-ended questions allowed respondents to qualify their views; qualifications were 
coded by the author to produce the final categorization of the response.  
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     Interviews were conducted with representatives of 14 of CID’s 17 affiliates, including 
at least one group in each of CID’s five work teams.  In addition to the leadership of the 
central coordinating organization, the Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE), 
representatives of the following organizations were interviewed:  Small and medium-
sized business team--Consejo Nacional de Empresarios Salvadoreños (CONAES), 
Federación Nacional de la Pequeña Empresa de El Salvador (FENAPES), Federación 
Independiente de Microempresarios Salvadoreños (FIMES); Labor team--Instituto de 
Estudios de la Mujer “Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera” (CEMUJER), Centro de 
Estudios del Trabajador (CENTRA), Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres (MSM), 
Organización de Mujeres Salvadoreñas (ORMUSA), and Comisión Intersindical;  
Agriculture team--Asociación para la Salud y el Servicio Social Intercomunal en El 
Salvador (APSIES)  and Fundación para la Formación de Dirigentes (FUNDACAMPO); 
Environment team--(ASDEMA); and  Democracy team--Coordinadora Nacional de 
Mujeres Salvadoreñas (CONAMUS) and Fundación Salvadoreña para la Promoción 
Social y el Desarrollo Económico (FUNSALPRODESE). 
     For the Foro Mesoamericano movement, interviews were conducted with the 
representatives of 8 organizations in either the Red Sinti Techán or the Movimiento 
Popular de Resistencia-12 de octubre (MPR12), the two national networks that 
coordinated El Salvador’s representation in the Foro Mesoamericano.  Red Sinti Techán 
representatives were drawn from the Centro para la Defensa del Consumidor-CDC 
(consumer protection), Las Dignas (feminist organization), and Unidad Ecológica 
Salvadoreña-UNES (environmental organization).  MPR12 representatives were selected 
from the leadership of the Foro de la Sociedad Civil-FSC (civil society), Asociación para 
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la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Comunal de El Salvador-CORDES (community 
development), Confederación de Federaciones de la Reforma Agraria Salvadoreña-
CONFRAS (rural cooperatives), Coordinadora Sindical de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores 
de El Salvador-CSTS (labor), and a large FSC affiliate, the Asociación de Comunidades 
Rurales para el Desarrollo de El Salvador (CRIPDES) (repopulated communities).  
     This research also draws on the author’s field notes from the three-day regional 
meeting of the V Foro Mesoamericano in San Salvador, July 19-21, 2004 and additional 
interviews with Salvadoran government officials and legislators in 2004 and 2005 and 
with Nicaraguan organizers in 2003 and 2006. 
 
NOTES 
*Research in El Salvador was supported by a grant from the College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences of DePaul University; research assistance was provided by Graciela González. 
Internet research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant #0125068 to 
DePaul University. 
 
1 With the addition of the Dominican Republic in August 2004, the agreement officially 
became DR-CAFTA. Colloquially, it is often still referred to as CAFTA in both the US 
and Central America. 
2 My use of the “critic negotiator” category roughly parallels Smith and Kororzeniewicz’s 
“insider” designation; my “transgressive resister” category is similar to their subcategory 
of “rejectionist outsiders” who, under the leadership of the Alianza Social Continental, 
boycotted official and semi-official consultation processes (2001 28).   
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3 Although civil society organizations and social movements may share characteristics, 
social movements are normally found to differ from other forms of “contentious politics” 
by the density of the networks they develop, the social solidarities and sense of common 
purpose they inspire, their use of “culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols,” and the 
durability of their confrontational interactions with the elites (Tarrow 1998, pp. 2, 4). 
4 As deployed in McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), for example, the distinction between 
“contained” versus “transgressive” social movements refers to whether the movement is 
drawn from “previously established” groups using conventional strategies or “newly self -
identified” groups using an innovative repertoire of tactics (pp. 7-8).  That distinction 
would seem to lend itself to labels like “pre-existing” versus “novel” rather than 
“contained” versus “transgressive.”  By common understanding, the trope of 
transgression carries more emphatic meanings than simply “new” or “different.”   
5 Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolaños (2001-2006) was a long-term leader of the 
national business peak association the Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP), 
and Salvadoran President “Tony” Saca (2004-2009) presided over that country’s business 
peak association Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP) immediately prior 
to assuming the executive office. 
6 Former Nicaraguan President Arnoldo Alemán (1996-2001), for example, made a failed 
bid to appropriate NGO funding by requiring that foreign donor support be funneled 
through the national treasury.  Although the move was quickly rescinded in the face of 
hearty domestic and international protest, it illustrated the tensions between the 
government and the NGO community (Kampwirth 2003). 
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7 Although Flores decreed the creation of a Comisión de Participación de la Sociedad 
Civil in 1999 as part of the international donor’s Consultative Group process after 
Hurricane Mitch, he never activated it, in spite of international pressure (Gass 2002, 27). 
Flores’ disinclination for consultation is also seen in the 2000 dollarization decision, 
which was announced in November 2000, approved by the legislature after only one 
week, and launched in January 2001, 39 days after his initial announcement (Towers and 
Borzutzky 2004). 
8The free trade agreements (FTAs) signed with Mexico and Chile had differentiated 
impacts on Salvadoran business, and a potential agreement with the US raised concern in 
vulnerable sectors.  Business chambers like Cámara Agropecuaria y Agroindustrial de El 
Salvador (CAMAGRO), which represented a range of agricultural producers, and the 
Asociación de Medianos y Pequeños Empresarios Salvadoreños (AMPES), representing 
the small and medium-sized enterprises, recognized their vulnerability to US exporters 
(especially given the hefty US agricultural subsidy in the Bush administration’s 2002 
Farm Bill).  CAMAGRO worked with similarly situated agricultural chambers in Central 
America to develop a proposal for “special and differentiated treatment” to defend their 
interests (FECAGRO 2003).  AMPES convened a conference in September 2003 to air its 
concerns and call for additional technical training and credit to meet CAFTA challenges 
(AMPES 2003). In spite of these concerns, neither broke ranks with the official business 
sector support for CAFTA. 
9 The measure was narrowly approved with support from 45 of the 84 deputies.  
According to Góche et al (2003, 101), “…this was the first commercial accord that had 
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any level (minimal) of legislative debate since the previous ones were signed without 
having been studied.”  
10 Affiliates were subsequently identified in Costa Rica and Honduras to complete the 
formal inclusion of networks in all five Central American countries. For a full list of CID 
affiliates, see Iniciativa CID (2003f).  
11 International funders included the Ford Foundation, NOVIB Holland, Oxfam America, 
Oxfam Great Britain, Diakonia Sweden, MS Denmark, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, 
UNDP, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, and Project Counseling Service (Iniciativa CID 
2002; Iniciativa CID 2003e, Forward).  
12 The private sector “side room” process was initiated by Mexican business 
representatives during the NAFTA negotiations in 1991 (Alba and Vega 2002, 60-64). 
13 The FTAA process, more than ten years in the making and heavily contested by 
activists, had prompted its framers to build in layers of buffering through civil society 
consultation processes (Smith and Korzeniewicz 2007; FTAA-Committee of Government 
Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society 2003). This precedent furthered the 
expectation of consultation in subsequent regional trade negotiations. 
14 The business sector figure included presentations to ODASP (41), business chambers 
and sectors (200), individual companies (44) and other business commissions (listed 
under “other”) (7). The other civil society organizations included Iniciativa CID (16), 
academic institutions (29), and Catholic Relief Services (1). The remaining 14% (56) 
were largely workshops with different government ministries and agencies. In addition, 
the Citizen Participation Program reported 104 meetings with credentialed participants in 
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the side rooms during the negotiation rounds and 42 other seminars orgranized by 
ministry staff (Ministerio de Economía 2004, 18-30). 
15 The Salvadoran Minister of Agriculture invited CID representatives to attend the Fifth 
Meeting of Central American Agriculture Ministers in Comalapa, El Savador on April 
27, 2003. CID leaders found that their agricultural concerns had much in common with 
those presented by the regional agricultural business chamber FECAGRO (Iniciativa CID 
2003a, 2003d; FECAGRO 2003).  
16 Public opinion poll data confirmed weaker support for CAFTA among PCN adherents.  
The 2005 poll by IUDOP (2005, 21) found, among respondents who identified with a 
political party, only 24% of PCN adherents thought CAFTA would help combat poverty 
vs. 51% of ARENA supporters. 
17 Zapatista leaders and allies had convened international gatherings in Chiapas (1996) 
and Spain (1997), designed to construct an international network of resistance.  
18 CEI was an organizational sponsor of the 2002 Foro Mesoamericano held in Managua 
and a coordinator of the Nicaraguan delegation to the 2004 Foro in San Salvador. 
19 The 2004 Foro Mesoamericano in San Salvador on July 19-21 was interlaced with 
eight formal companion gatherings, each focused a different topic--women, peasants, 
young people, biodiversity, dams, labor unions, popular education and community. 
20Declaración del Foro de Información, Análisis y Propuestas 2001; Declaración del 
Foro 2001; Declaración Política del III Foro Mesoamericano 2002; Memoria, III Foro 
2002 (appendix); Comité Organizador del IV Foro Mesoamericano 2004, 125; and 
Information Packet 2004. 
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21 V Foro sponsors included Oxfam, Pan para el Mundo, NOVIB, Share, and Desarrollo y 
Paz (Canada) (MPR12 2004a). 
22 CRIPDES, a MPR12 affiliate, worked in 300 communities repopulated by returning 
refugees during the 1980s and claimed to represent over 100,000 people (MPR12 2004b).  
CONFRAS, which represented agrarian reform cooperatives forged during and after the 
war, claimed 11,500 direct and 75,000 indirect associates (CONFRAS 2004). 
Nonetheless, MPR12 affiliates had generally lost members in the preceding five years.  
The FSC, which claimed over 70 affiliated organizations when it emerged, fueled by 
international donor support for civil society participation in Post-Mitch and post-
earthquake aid deliberations, reported only 10 affiliates in July 2004 (FSC 2004).  
Disillusionment about the lack of government compliance with agreements, the defection 
of women’s organizations claiming inadequate representation, the unwillingness of the 
Flores administration to consult with civil society, the withering of donor financial 
support, and the generally dispiriting consequences of economic duress were all cited by 
FSC organizers as factors contributing to the network’s decline. 
23 RST coordinator Raúl Moreno was an active participant in the Alianza Social 
Continental, which actively sponsored his research and publications.  See Moreno (2003); 
Bloque Popular Centroamericano et al (2004).   
24 Raúl Moreno of Red Sinti Techán previously worked under Roberto Rubio at FUNDE, 
and their parting was conflictual.  Interpersonal tensions layered into other the areas of 
difference to exacerbate divisions.  
25 Comparative studies of the impact of social movements on international agreements 
note the particular resistance of trade negotiations to civil society inclusion.  Smith and 
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Korzeniewicz (forthcoming 2007) compare the Summit of the Americas process, where 
“insiders” had some impact, with the FTAA track, which was “shaped by the dominant 
logic of exclusion” (p. 263).   della Porta and Tarrow (2005, 6) also note the difference 
between arenas governed by internationally established norms, such as human rights, and 
those directed by “internationally hegemonic discourse,” such as market liberalization, 
where activists have had less influence. 
26 Saca won the 2004 presidential election handily in the first round with 58% of the vote 
against 36% for second-place rival, long-term FMLN leader Schafik Handal. 
27 CAFTA was ratified in five more countries in 2005, in spite of five days of protests that 
left 1 dead and 10 wounded in Guatemala (Castillo and Espinoza 2005).  Implementation 
began in El Salvador in April 2006.  As of January 2007, only Costa Rica had not ratified 
the agreement.  
